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RECENT
DEVELOPMENT
DAMAGES FOR INSIDER TRADING IN
THE OPEN MARKET: A NEW
LIMITATION ON RECOVERY UNDER
RULE 10b-5
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.' a federal court implied
for the first time a private civil cause of action2 for aggrieved inves-
tors under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343
and its administrative counterpart, rule 10b-5.4 Since that time
courts have struggled to delineate the proper scope of a defen-
dant's liability in a way that will effectuate the purposes of the
1. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
2. The Supreme Court has affirmed this implied right and has held that it applies to
open market as well as face-to-face transactions. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12, 13 n.9 (1971).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) states,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule 10b-5 is the result of the grant of rulemaking
authority provided for in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
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implied private right." After Kardon there was a steady judicial
expansion of rule 10b-5's general availability to complainants,
mainly through a relaxation of common-law proof requirements.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to reverse this
trend in several landmark decisions that narrow the scope of sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5.7
Not surprisingly, the issue of the measure of damages in such
actions has failed to emerge unscathed from this judicial confusion.
Part of the problem is that few rule 10b-5 cases have actually pro-
ceeded to a final judgment on the merits, since most are either re-
solved at the pleading stage or settled by the litigants themselves.8
Perhaps even more troublesome is the transformation of rule 10b-5
into a catch-all antifraud provision,9 with the result that any at-
5. E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (courts
should construe securities fraud provisions flexibly to effectuate their remedial purposes);
SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (equitable ancillary remedies
are appropriate to effectuate remedial purposes of the Act and protect the investing public);
Note, Rule 10b-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law Remedy, 28 U.
FLA. L. Rav. 76, 76-77 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (proof
of materiality suffices to establish reliance and causation in fact in a nondisclosure case);
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976)
(proof of subjective reliance is not necessary); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elecs. Corp., 363 F.
Supp. 574, 580-81 (1973) (materiality satisfies causation in fact, priority is not necessary,
and proof of reliance is not required in an open market case even if there is misrepresenta-
tion); Note, supra note 5, at 76.
7. See, e.g., TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (materiality means
that there must be a "substantial likelihood" that a reasonable investor's decision would
have been affected); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required for
a finding of liability); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (plain-
tiff must be either a purchaser or seller of securities).
8. Abrahamson v. Flescbner, 392 F. Supp. 740, 745-46 (S.D.N.Y.), decision reserved
pending further briefs, 537 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Gottlieb v. Sandia
Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1969), afl'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208
F. Supp. 808, 824 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Cobine, Elements of
Liability and Actual Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 651.
Another reason why so few cases have reached the damage issue is that plaintiffs rarely
prove all the requisite elements of a cause of action. 11 Lov. L.A.L. Ray. 233, 248 (1978).
9. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 n.1 (8th Cir. 1977); SEC v.
R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 876 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Note, Damages to Uninformed
Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 299 (1974). Ini-
tially, the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to cor-
rect an oversight in § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), which
had afforded protection to defrauded purchasers but not to defrauded sellers. Pappas v.
Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345, 363 (D.N.J. 1966). For a comprehensive discussion of all the availa-
ble fraud provisions in the securities statutes, see 3 L. Loss, SacuRrrTs REGULATION 1421-
1528 (2d ed. 1961).
RULE 10b-5 DAMAGES
tempt to design a uniform damage rule would necessarily be incon-
sistent and confused. Finally, since section 27 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193410 endows the courts with general equity
powers,11 those courts that have awarded "actual damages' 2 have
tended to seek the best solution for the case at hand rather than
formulate a hard and fast rule of law.1 3 As a result, the law on
damages in rule 10b-5 cases remains unsettled. 4
Nowhere is this disagreement over the measure of damages
more apparent than in cases concerning insider trading on undis-
closed or misrepresented material information in the open market.
As discussed below, application of conventional damage standards
to this area is usually unsatisfactory and can lead to recoveries far
out of proportion to any evil that the defendant may have commit-
ted. 5 Both courts and commentators have acknowledged the need
to limit recoveries for insider trading in the open market in viola-
tion of rule 10b-5,' 6 but no consensus has emerged on how best to
accomplish this end.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,7 confronted the ques-
tion of what measure of damages should be levied against a corpo-
ration for "tippee trading" on material inside information. The
court held that an uninformed purchaser whose decision would
have been affected by knowledge of the inside information may re-
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
11.. SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
12. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act limits a plaintiff's recovery to actual damages:
The rights and remedies provided by [the 1934 Act] shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person permitted
to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of [the 1934 Act] shall recover,
through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his
actual damages on account of the act complained of.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). Most courts and commentators agree that this section prohibits
the imposition of punitive damages. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1969); Note, supra note 9, at 305. But cf. 16 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 404, 417-20 (1969) (punitive damages can and should be allowed in rule lob-5 cases).
13. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977); Gottlieb v.
Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1969), afi'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971).
14. 304 F. Supp. at 991.
15. See notes 109-17 infra and accompanying text.
16. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 323 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Green v. Occidential Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335,
1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring in part); Cobine, supra note 8, at 683; Jacobs,
The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 65 GEo. L.J. 1093, 1131 (1977); Note, supra
note 9, at 308; Note, supra note 5, at 99.
17. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
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cover an amount equal to any postpurchase decline in the market
value of his stock up to a reasonable time after the public disclo-
sure of that information.18 The court, however, added a crucial ca-
veat to its holding by limiting the total amount of these plaintiffs
recovery to the amount that the tippee gained from trading on the
inside information. 19
The Elkind decision is certain to have an effect not only upon
the size of monetary recoveries, but also upon the scope of insider
liability generally in the open market setting. After examining the
methods and measures of recovery in securities fraud actions, this
Recent Development analyzes whether the Elkind result was a de-
parture from or the logical outgrowth of prior case law. This Re-
cent Development then examines whether the proffered solution in
Elkind was the best of all available alternatives.
II. THE POOL FROM WHICH TO CHOOSE: METHODS AND MEASURES
OF RECOVERY IN VARIABLE CONTEXTS
A. The SEC Disgorgement Method
Apart from referring possible securities fraud cases to the At-
torney General for criminal prosecution,20 the only enforcement
mechanism traditionally thought to be available to the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) was a request for injunctive relief.1
It is well settled, for example, that the SEC is not entitled to levy
penal sanctions or impose its administrative remedies in a punitive
fashion. 2
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,23 however, the Second Cir-
cuit held that the SEC could require defendants to disgorge their
profits to defrauded plaintiffs as ancillary relief to the normal ac-
tion for an injunction." Since that time courts have continued to
allow the SEC to engage in this type of restitutionary enforce-
18. Id. at 170.
19. Id.
20. Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
21. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in
part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 446
F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971).
22. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977
DuKE L.J. 641, 652.
23. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), on
remand, 312 F. Supp 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
24. 446 F.2d at 1308.
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ment.2 5 The practice, however, is intended purely to provide an ad-
ded deterrent to securities fraud and does not attempt to make
investors whole.26 Thus, in Texas Gulf Sulphur the court made de-
fendants' disgorged profits available for the claims of injured in-
vestors, but it did not make allowance for the possibility that the
amount claimed might exceed the amount disgorged. 7
B. Measures of Damages in Face-to-Face Transactions
Courts have fashioned a variety of remedies for defrauded
buyers and sellers in situations in which the parties deal directly
with one another rather than through an impersonal market. Mea-
sures of damages and forms of relief under rule 10b-5 can loosely
be classified as the "out-of-pocket" measure, the "cover" and Cha-
sins measures, and rescission and restitutionary relief. In addition,
although courts have begun to require defendants to disgorge their
excess profits, they have refused to award punitive damages. These
methods of measuring recovery ostensibly fit into traditional dam-
ages and relief theories. In practice, however, courts have not hesi-
tated to modify these theories to reach an equitable result.
1. The Out-of-Pocket Measure
The traditional damage measure in rule 10b-5 cases ostensibly
follows the "out-of-pocket" rule,8 which is a legacy from the
25. See SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. R.J. Allen & As-
socs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Ellsworth, supra note .22, at 641-42.
26. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970). The court in Dolgow stated,
Because of budgetary limitations and alternative demands on available man-
power, the Commission cannot fully investigate or take action in every case of possi-
ble violation....
... While in rare cases, as an adjunct to injunctive relief, the Commission has
urged a court to deprive violators of their illegal gains by directing that those be paid
to individuals who have been injured by their violations, even in such cases the Com-
mission does not seek to make investors whole; it serves merely to deter violators by
making violations unprofitable ....
Thus, "[p]rivate enforcement... provides a necessary supplement to Commission
action," by both affording relief to those injured by violations of the securities laws and
serving as a deterrent for future wrongdoing.
Id. at 483-84 (emphasis in original).
27. 312 F. Supp. at 93.
28. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolas & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977); Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Harris v. Amer-
ican Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224-25 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1054 (1976); Madi-
gan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974).
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method of calculating damages in common-law fraud cases.29 The
out-of-pocket rule awards a defrauded buyer or seller the differ-
ence between the price paid or received for the securitiy and its
actual fair market value, with both values measured at the time of
the fraudulent transaction." The rule focuses on what the plaintiff
has lost rather than on what he might have gained, 1 making no
allowance for any disgorgement of the defendant's gain in excess of
the plaintiff's loss.
32
The out-of-pocket rule works well when "the defendant's
fraud conceals the actual value of the item purchased, yet does not
affect the overall market value of that item.13 3 A plaintiff's loss,
however, will often not materialize until after the fraudulent trans-
action 3 4-for example, when the consideration given equals the
consideration received" and the value of the security is affected
29. Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 1054 (1976); Estate Counseling Serv. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
303 F.2d 527, 532-33 (10th Cir. 1962).
30. Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970
(1978); Estate Counseling Serv. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527
(10th Cir. 1962); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1962), affd, 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). Thus, if defendant fraudulently induced plaintiff to purchase a
security for consideration worth $50 when its fair value was only $40 at the time of the
fraudulent transaction, then plaintiff could recover $10 per share, regardless of any subse-
quent change in the price of the security. Conversely, a defrauded seller could recover $10
per share if he or she sold a security with a fair value of $50 for consideration worth $40.
31. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977); Harris v.
American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1054 (1976);
Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974); Estate Counseling Serv. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962).
If courts allowed the plaintiff to recover what he might have gained, they would award
damages in accordance with the "benefit-of-the-bargain" measure, which is the difference
between the fair value received and the value as represented by the defendant. Jacobs,
supra note 16, at 1108-09.
32. As the court stated in the early case of Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808
(E.D. Wis. 1962), af'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963):
"Actual damages" are to be computed under the federal "out of pocket" rule applied in
fraud actions, i.e., the difference between the price received by the plaintiff and the
real or actual value of the stock at the date of the sale. Under this rule, a plaintiff is
entitled to recover what he has lost by the sale but may not recover any actual or
potential gain that was received by the defendants.
Id. at 825.
33. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977).
34. Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 1054 (1976); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928 (1969).
35. See Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977) (refusal
to deny plaintiff recovery when value of bonds equals their purchase price).
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only later when the fraud becomes known."6 In these common situ-
ations courts have modified the rigid out-of-pocket formula to en-
sure that injured plaintiffs obtain an adequate recovery.3
7
Courts usually have achieved this qualification of the out-of-
pocket rule by determining the fair market value of the security at
the time of the fraudulent transaction by reference to the secur-
ity's value at some posttransaction date, usually the date on which
the fraud was or should have been discovered. For example, in Es-
plin v. Hirschi,38 in which defendants defrauded purchasers by
failing to give a prospectus or to disclose the rights and privileges
of various classes of stock, the court stated that only when the
fraudulent conduct is made public can the true value of a security
as an investment be determined. Consequently, the Esplin court
awarded the defrauded buyer the difference between the price paid
for the securities40 and the actual value of the securities deter-
mined as of the date of discovery of the fraud.41 Similarly in Ross
v. Licht42 plaintiffs sold stock to defendants at $120 per share
without knowledge that the stock would later be offered at $300
per share. The court looked to the date on which the stock was
offered for $300 to determine its value at the date of the fraudu-
lent sale.43 Courts have continued to follow this practice since Es-
pUn and Ross, stating straightforwardly that they are modifying
36. Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 1054 (1976); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928 (1969).
37. Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971)
("courts on several occasions have exercised equitable discretion to modify traditional reme-
dies strictly interpreted so as to grant relief which is fair and appropriate in the circum-
stances before them"); Cobine, supra note 8, at 675 ("courts are willing to modify applica-
tion of the out-of-pocket rule under any number of special circumstances"); Note,
Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 165,
179 ("Courts have taken an ad hoc approach, the initial reference point being the common
law out-of-pocket loss measure of recovery. Beyond this, the courts have exercised discretion
traditionally left to trial courts in finding damages appropriate to the facts of the case.").
38. 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
39. Id. at 104.
40. The court in Esplin computed the purchase price by adding interest from the date
of the transaction to the actual price paid. Id. at 105.
41. Id. A buyer in this situation is also entitled to recover any additional outlays at-
tributable to the defendant's fraudulent conduct, minus any dividends or other payments
the purchasers might have received from the defendant. Id. See also Janigan v. Taylor, 344
F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Estate Counseling Serv. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
42. 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
43. Id. at 410.
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the dates on which out-of-pocket valuations are to be made in or-
der to make injured plaintiffs whole.""
2. The "Cover" and Chasins Measures
Another method of measuring damages-also more flexible
than the strict out-of-pocket rule-is the so called "cover" mea-
sure, which allows a defrauded seller to recover the difference be-
tween the highest value attained by a security within a reasonable
period after he discovered or should have discovered the fraudu-
lent conduct and the fair value of the consideration received, mea-
sured at the time of the wrongful transaction."" A case in point is
Baumel v. Rosen,"4 in which defendant buyers induced plaintiffs to
sell by misrepresenting that the company was in a poor financial
condition.47 The court held that rescission" was unavailable to
plaintiffs because they had been dilatory in requesting it;49 never-
theless, the court awarded damages in the amount of the mean
price of the stock on the day after plaintiff knew or should have
known of the fraud,50 minus the purchase price received for the
44. Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 1054 (1976) (when defendant's conduct creates an artificial market of long duration,
damages are fixed at the date of discovery of the fraud rather than at the date of purchase);
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43 (10th Cir. 1971) (complaining party is entitled to
be made whole, so calculation of out-of-pocket damages is to be made at time of discovery of
fraud).
45. For instance, if plaintiff sold stock with a fair value of $50 at the time of the
fraudulent transaction for $40, and the stock's highest attained value within a reasonable
time after disclosure (two weeks, for example) was $100, then plaintiff could recover $60 per
share. If plaintiff is a defrauded buyer, then the fact setting would differ but the theory
would not. If he buys stock with a fair value of $40 for $50, and the lowest attained value of
the stock within a reasonable time after disclosure is $20, then plaintiff could recover $30
per share. No court, however, has strictly followed this theory in the case of a defrauded
buyer. See notes 55-57 infra and accompanying text; Jacobs, supra note 16, at 1102-03;
Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities,
26 STAN. L. REv. 371, 378-81 (1974). Courts will not use the highest price within a reasona-
ble period when, for example, plaintiff covers for less than the highest price during the
reasonable period. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 1105-16. Additionally, although the REsTATE-
MENT OF REsTrrUTION requires plaintiff to prove that he would have sold at this highest
price, in practice courts have not required this proof. Id. at 1103 n.61.
46. 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
47. Id. at 573.
48. See notes 58-73 infra and accompanying text.
49. 412 F.2d at 574.
50. Since the reasonable period after discovery of the fraud was only one day due to
the volatile nature of first-offering stock prices, the court did not explicitly use the highest
value attained. The court in Baumel, however, harmonized its calculation with that of the
trial judge, who had specifically mentioned that the proper figure in a damage measurement
was the highest attained value. Id. at 576.
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shares, both figures being calculated together with interest.5 1 The
cover measure assumes in theory that plaintiff either would have
reentered the market to purchase the stock he had sold previously
to the defendant,5 2 or that he would not have sold at all until the
price reached its highest value.58 This measure makes plaintiff
whole by awarding the appreciation in value of the stock from the
time he was fraudulently induced to sell until the time he knew or
should have known of the defendant's deceptive conduct."
Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.5 5 arguably embodies a coun-
terpart to the cover measure. Defendant had induced plaintiff to
purchase securities without disclosing that he was making a mar-
ket in those securities in the over-the-counter market. The court
granted damages in the amount of the difference between the
purchase price to Chasins and the amount he received when he
51. In accord with the Baumel court in using the highest intermediate value method of
calculating damages is Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973), a case
brought under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976), for
fraudulent proxies during a merger. For a discussion of the use of the cover method in the
open market, see notes 118-23 infra and accompanying text.
52. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971). See notes 118-23 infra and accompanying text.
53. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 745 (8th Cir. 1967) (dictum in approving trial court's
jury instruction).
54. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 745 (8th Cir. 1967) (dictum in approving
trial court's jury instruction).
55. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970). Some commentators have characterized Chasins as a
special form of rescissory damages that merely employs an atypical valuation date. Cobine,
supra note 8, at 672-73; Note, supra note 45, at 376. A more recent commentary on rule
10b-5 damages, however, suggests that Chasins should be considered apart from the rescis-
sion remedy as the mirror image of the cover measure. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 1107-08.
The latter position is more sound analytically, even though it is true that the Chasins mea-
sure is in part motivated by the fact that the plaintiff resells prior to discovery of the fraud.
Whereas a rescissory theory of damages calculates plaintiff's recovery at the date of judg-
ment, the Chasins court was concerned solely with the amount the plaintiff-purchaser re-
ceived on the resale of his depreciated security (minus his original purchase price). This is
far more analogous to awarding an aggrieved investor the amount it would take to reinvest
in an appreciated security (minus the plaintiff's original selling price) than to attempting to
place parties in their status quo ante through voidance of the transaction. See notes 58-73
infra and accompanying text. Moreover, if one focuses on the language in Chasins to the
effect that the wrongdoing consisted not of price manipulation but of inducing plaintiff to
purchase at all, it is implicit in the court's holding that without defendant's fraud plaintiff
would never have entered the transaction. Note, supra note 45, at 376. This subjective de-
termination of what the investor would have done absent fraud is precisely analogous to the
underlying rationale of the cover measure. In practice, this distinction between Chasins and
rescissory damages is more theoretical than real, since courts utilizing a rescissory measure
of damages often make the calculation prior to the date of judgment at some posttransac-
tion date. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (8th Cir. 1977); Jacobs,
supra note 16, at 1119.
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subsequently sold the securities prior to his awareness of defen-
dant's deceptive conduct.56 The court in Chasins justified its de-
parture from the traditional rule of damages by noting that the
evil was not that plaintiff's purchase price was inflated, but that
plaintiff was made to purchase at all without knowledge of defen-
dant's interest in the securities.
57
3. Rescission and Restitutionary Relief
In addition to modifying conventional measures of damages,
courts may fashion equitable relief by allowing a plaintiff who
moves with reasonable dispatch" to rescind a fraudulent transac-
tion and seek specific restitution.59 If the plaintiff or defendant no
longer possesses the security, then the aggrieved party may obtain
rescissory damages in lieu of specific restitution.0 A contractual
relationship with at least one defendant is a prerequisite to rescis-
sion, 1 but the transaction may be voided through operation of law
pursuant to section 29(b) of the 1934 Act,62 rather than through
overt action by the plaintiff. 3
In theory, the objective of rescissory damages is the return of
parties to the status quo ante the sale; these damages constitute
56. 438 F.2d at 1173.
57. Id. The court in Sarlie v. E.L. Bruce Co., 265 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
measured damages in a similar fashion, grounding its departure from the out-of-pocket rule
in the fact that plaintiff sold his stock prior to discovery of the fraud, so that the actual
value of the shares at the time of the fraudulent transaction, free of defendant's deceptive
manipulation, could not be accurately determined.
58. See, e.g., Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1037 (1976) (plaintiffs' failure to act vigilantly cost them the right to rescind); Estate Coun-
seling Serv. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir.
1962) (law requires plaintiff to act promptly or waive right to rescind).
59. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 1109-10. Courts, however, consider the rescission remedy
a radical one. Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1037 (1970); Cobine, supra note 8, at 673.
60. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed,
J., concurring in part); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967); Note, supra note
45, at 371.
61. See, e.g., Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring in part) (theory of rescission is rooted in a contract of sale); Estate
Counseling Serv. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 531 (10th Cir.
1962) (rescission remedy is based on invalidity of a contract); Jacobs, supra note 16, at 1110,
1120 & n.166 (citing Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974)).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1976) (any contract made in violation of 1934 Act is void).
63. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 741-42 (8th Cir. 1967)(§ 29(b) renders void any
contract made in violation of rule 10b-5). Cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
387-88 (1970) (contract is voidable at the option of the innocent party); Jacobs, supra note
16, at 1111.
RULE 10b-5 DAMAGES
the monetary equivalent of specific restoration of the security in
question on the day judgment is rendered." Thus, as the court
stated in Gottlieb v. Sandia American Corp.,"5 "damages will be
awarded in the amount of the difference between the present mar-
ket value of the consideration originally given and the considera-
tion received."" This statement typically means that a defrauded
seller will receive the fair market value of the security sold at the
time of judgment, minus the purchase price he originally received;
a defrauded buyer will receive the price he originally paid for the
security, minus the security's fair market value at the time judg-
ment is rendered.
7
Just as the courts have modified the out-of-pocket rule, so
have they injected some flexibility into the dates on which they
measure rescissory damages. The most important and frequently
used technique is to value the security on some earlier, posttran-
saction date rather than on the day of judgment.e8 The principal
motivation for this change is a desire to induce plaintiffs to sue
promptly, along with a corresponding reluctance to compensate
plaintiff for his delay or to punish defendant for accretions beyond
those resulting from the disposition of his stock or the perpetration
of his fraud.69 Accordingly, courts will often award rescissory dam-
ages equal to the difference between the fair market value of the
security at the time the plaintiff discovered or should have discov-
ered the fraud and the original consideration paid or received for
64. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed,
J., concurring in part); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967).
65. 304 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 452
F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971).
66. Id. at 990 (citation omitted).
67. Assume, for example, that stock with a fair market value of $50 at the time of the
transaction is sold for $40 in cash, and that the fair value of the stock is $100 on the date of
judgment. A defrauded seller would recover $60 per share-the difference between this $100
and the value of the consideration received as of the judgment date (which is still $40).
Similarly, if a defrauded buyer purchased for $50 cash a stock with a fair value of $40 on the
date of the wrongful transaction and $20 on the date of judgment, he would recover $30 per
share ($50 minus $20, or the fair value of the stock and consideration paid, both measured
at the date of judgment).
68. Note, supra note 45, at 372. See Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357,
1361 (8th Cir. 1977).
69. Note, supra note 45, at 372-73. See also Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970) (courts should require prompt movement for
rescission because plaintiff should not be allowed to speculate, and with every day's lapse it
is more difficult to return parties to status quo ante); Estate Counseling Serv. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1962).
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the stock.70 A classic example of this flexible measure of recovery
appears in Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 7 1 in which defendants
fraudulently induced a plaintiff of limited sophistication to
purchase into a special bond margin account program by misrepre-
senting the safety of the investment. The Eighth Circuit in
Garnatz noted that the out-of-pocket rule is not a talisman and
that when use of this measure would deny plaintiffs any recovery,
the measure should be varied to fashion a remedy best suited to
the harm. 2 Consequently, the court awarded plaintiff damages
equal to the decline in the value of his bonds, as determined by the
losses sustained up to the time of plaintiff's actual or constructive
notice of the fraud concerning both the bonds held and those
sold.7
3
4. Disgorgement of Profits
In addition to developing several ways in which to compensate
plaintiffs for losses resulting from rule 10b-5 violations, courts have
also begun to award to an injured plaintiff that part of a defen-
dant's unjust enrichment that exceeds plaintiff's loss. 7 4 This prac-
tice clearly runs counter to the early statement made by the court
in Kohler v. Kohler Co. 7 15 that while a defrauded party may recover
his loss, he may not recover any actual or potential gain received
by the defendant.78 The seminal authority for the proposition that
a court should give a wrongdoer's profits to the injured party is
70. Thus, in the example in note 67 supra, if the stock had risen to a value of only $90
at the time of discovery of the fraud, or conversely had only fallen to a value of $30 in the
case of a defrauded buyer, these figures would be used instead of the respectively higher or
lower values on the date of judgment. The defrauded seller would recover $50, and the de-
frauded buyer would recover $20.
71. 559 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977).
72. Id. at 1360.
73. Id. at 1361. Note that it is here, when plaintiff sells securities prior to the discov-
ery of the fraud, that the distinction between this modified rescissory measure of damages
and the Chasins measure breaks down. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text. See
also Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J.,
concurring in part).
74. For example, if plaintiff suffered only a $10 loss attributable to defendant's mis-
conduct, but defendant reaped a $100 gain due to unrelated market forces, then plaintiff
could recover defendant's $100 windfall. This does not mean, however, that a plaintiff may
cause a defendant to disgorge his unjust enrichment in the absence of a showing of some
loss. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740, 747 (S.D.N.Y.), decision reserved pending
further briefs, 537 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1975), afl'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 568
F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
75. 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
76. Id. at 825.
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Janigan v. Taylor,7 in which defendants reaped substantial profits
from the resale of stock that they acquired fraudulently through
misrepresentations and omissions concerning a company's future
growth prospects. The court in Janigan held that simple equity
demands that defendants' future profits, even though unforesee-
able at the time of the fraudulent transfer, be disgorged and
awarded to the defrauded party.78 Other federal courts have fol-
lowed Janigan7 9 and the Supreme Court has placed its stamp of
approval on the use of this method at least in defrauded seller
cases.8 0
As originally formulated, the disgorgement of profits rule was
applicable only to defrauded seller cases.8" In Zeller v. Bogue Elec-
tric Manufacturing Corp.,82 however, the Second Circuit elimi-
nated this distinction by requiring disgorgement of a seller's wind-
fall profits to a defrauded buyer. Zeller was a shareholder's
derivative action in which a parent caused its subsidiary to make
interest-free loans, the disclosure of which aborted the subsidiary's
public offering. Plaintiffs sued for the profit that the parent real-.
ized on the loaned money, in addition to recovery of the principal
and interest. The court found that prior case law did not distin-
guish between defrauded buyers and sellers and held that the law
77. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
78. Id. at 786. In theory, the amount that defendant must disgorge does not include
any amount that he obtains through his own special efforts apart from the fraud. Id. at 787.
In practice, however, courts have interpreted this limitation quite broadly. See Rochez Bros.
v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976) (court allowed
disgorgement of profits on deal subsequent to one that motivated fraud, even though first
deal fell through).
79. See, e.g., Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
970 (1979); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993
(1976); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971) (no recovery because no loss
shown); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967).
80. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
81. Id.; Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971); Janigan v. Taylor, 344
F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). The rationale behind this distinc-
tion appears to have been twofold. First, since disgorgement of unjust enrichment is based
in theory upon the proposition that an injured party should receive benefits he would other-
wise have been in a position to obtain for himself, and since a defrauding seller normally
uses the proceeds of his sale to enter into an entirely separate transaction, it is difficult for a
defrauded buyer to contend that he would have made the same use of those funds. Zeller v.
Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 802 n.10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). A
defrauded seller, on the other hand, can show far more easily that he would have sold the
security at the same time and for the same price as the fraudulent purchaser. Id. Second, a
more practical consideration is "not any decisive legal difference but the difficulty generally
confronting the defrauded buyer in showing that the fraudulent seller has in fact reaped
such a profit." Id. at 802.
82. 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
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of restitution could require that a defrauding seller disgorge his
profits.8 3 Moreover, in Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson" the
Sixth Circuit flatly stated that "[t]he proper standard of damages
for either a defrauded seller or buyer under Rule 10b-5 is 'dis-
gorgement of profits.'85
5. Punitive Damages
For both policy and statutory reasons, courts generally agree
that an aggrieved investor may not recover punitive damages when
suing under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.6 Several courts have
based their decision upon section 28(a) of the Exchange Act, hold-
ing that this section precludes punitive damages because it limits
plaintiffs' recoveries to "actual damages.
8 s7
The Tenth Circuit discussed comprehensively the availability
of punitive damages in securities fraud cases in de Haas v. Empire
Petroleum Co.88 The court stressed that absent direction from ei-
ther section 28(a) itself or from the Act's legislative history, policy
considerations should be overriding. 89 Noting that punitive dam-
ages serve the purposes of deterrence and retribution, as well as
that of giving individuals an incentive to sue, the court then stated
that the last purpose "could be especially important since private
enforcement of the security laws is necessary due to the limited
resources of the SEC."90 Nevertheless, the court felt that, when
combined with criminal sanctions, the already available deterrence
mechanisms were potent if not adequate:
[T]here is the threat of suspension of registrations, suspension of trading, or
expulsion from a national securities exchange. Besides these express deter-
rents, there is the nebulous social stigma of being branded a knowing violator
of the law.
Perhaps the most important strengthening of securities laws enforcement
has occurred with the liberalization of the class action under the revised Fed.
83. Id. at 802.
84. 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 190.
86. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 784 (3d Cir. 1976); Flaks
v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1974); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 45 (10th
Cir. 1971); de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1229-31 (10th Cir. 1970); Green
v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968).
87. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 784 (3d Cir. 1976); Rich-
ardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 45 (10th Cir. 1971); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291,
302 (2d Cir. 1968).
88. 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
89. Id. at 1230. Accord, Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968) (must
look at Act's purpose since legislative history does not deal with intent behind § 28(a)).
90. 435 F.2d at 1230.
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R. Civ. P. 23.... Since these procedural devices allow many small claims to
be litigated in the same action, the overall size of compensatory damages
alone may constitute a significant deterrent.91
Moreover, the de Haas court pointed out that one potential prob-
lem with punitive damages was that the burden of these recoveries
might fall on innocent stockholders if the defendant is a public
corporation.2 Additionally, the court noted that juries might
award excessive amounts; even though the court acknowledged
that judicial controls over verdicts -could reduce this danger, it felt
that postverdict procedures were only indicative of initial failures
in the judicial process. Perhaps the greatest problem, in the Tenth
Circuit's view, was how to deal with the case in which multiple
plaintiffs sue in different courts or at different times, since this
might result in either excessive recoveries or windfalls to plaintiffs
who sue promptly and inequitable restrictions on those who are
late. The court therefore concluded that these problems out-
weighed any need for added deterrence and held that punitive
91. Id. at 1230-31. Other courts have stressed the same factors in much the same way.
For example, in Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), the court said,
We do not believe that Congress intended the Securities and Exchange Act to be used
as a vehicle for the recovery of judgments that could often be grossly disproportionate
to the harm done.
Nor are punitive damages needed as a deterrent in this area. In cases such as this
it is possible that corporations and even other individuals such as officers, would be
subject to crushing liabilities simply on the basis of actual damages because of the
cumulative injury that a misstatement concerning widely held stock can cause....
[C]lass actions, derivative suits and other such procedural devices provide sufficient
incentive to insure that those injured by a violation of 10b-5 will have adequate oppor-
tunity to confront alleged malefactors and to have appropriate sanctions imposed upon
them. Moreover as an added deterrent the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains
provisions imposing criminal penalties on violators.
Id. at 303 (citations omitted). In a later action, the Second Circuit applied the same ratio-
nale in a case decided under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. After noting that there is
deterrence through criminal sanctions, SEC expulsions and suspensions, and the possibility
of being labelled a knowing violator of the law, the court stated,
Furthermore, private actions often lead to sizable [sic] recoveries and to considerable
deterrent clout. In Green v. Wolf Corp.. . . we recognized that a class action under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 could be particularly effective and appropriate in remedying viola-
tions of the securities acts when the injury to any individual was not large enough to
provoke him to legal action. Thus, a recurring rationale for punitive damages-that the
lure of a windfall is required to encourage suits to enforce the Act-has lesser impact
where the class action for the small litigant would be appropriate. Compensatory dam-
ages, especially when multiplied in a class action, have a potent deterrent effect.
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970) (citations omitted).
92. 435 F.2d at 1230. Another court has made the same point. Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968).
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damages were not recoverable in a private action under rule 10b-
5.93
Although de Haas is clearly representative of the great weight
of authority, not all courts have completely foreclosed the possibil-
ity of punitive damages in a rule 10b-5 case. For example, some
courts have held that a court may award punitive damages on a
pendent state claim brought in conjunction with a federal securi-
ties law cause of action. 4 Perhaps the most notable case to award
punitive damages is Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,95 in which a
federal district court reasoned that since section 28(a) applies only
to damage suits "permitted to be maintained... under the provi-
sions of this chapter," implied causes of action based on tort prin-
ciples are free from that section's limitations.8 This rationale,
however, may not have been necessary, because the Hecht court
applied it on the expressed assumption that the term "actual dam-
ages" is used in section 28(a) in contradistinction to punitive dam-
ages, rather than merely in contradistinction to a possible double
recovery on more than one cause of action, or to a recovery in ex-
cess of a plaintiff's loss. 9 7 Indeed, some courts have at least implic-




If a trend can be distilled from the myriad remedies and mea-
sures of damages used by courts in face-to-face transactions, it is a
movement away from traditional rigid formulae in order to effectu-
ate the dual purposes of rule 10b-5-to deter misconduct and to
compensate injured investors.9 Thus, practical distinctions among
the out-of-pocket rule as modified,100 the Chasins measure,101 and
the rescissory damages measure as calculated prior to the date of
judgment 0 2 often evaporate, 103 so that regardless of the theoretical
93. 435 F.2d at 1230-32.
94. See Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1974); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F.
Supp. 714, 742-43 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
95. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
96. Id. at 444 (quoting § 28(a)).
97. Id.
98. See de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968).
99. See Note, supra note 5, at 77-79; note 26 supra.
100. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 67-73 supra and accompanying text.
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underpinnings of an award, the court calculates it as the difference
between the fair market value of the security upon discovery of the
fraud (or the resale price if plaintiff sells prior to this discovery' 4)
and the consideration paid or received.10 5 In this way, courts com-
pensate plaintiffs for posttransaction declines or appreciations in
their manipulated securities. In addition, courts under rule 10b-5
have required disgorgement of a defendant's unjust enrichment in
order to ensure that violations of the rule are unprofitable and that
its deterrence purpose is attained. °10 Perhaps the best summary of
this trend is in Nelson v. Serwold, 0 7 in which the court said,
The early cases generally awarded the difference between the value given and
the value received, but the recent trend looks to defendant's profits, rather
than to plaintiff's losses, in measuring damages....
This rule provides full compensation for injury caused by fraudulent con-
duct, and, significantly, it removes all incentive to engage in such conduct.108
C. The Open Market Problem and Initial Attempts to Find a
Solution
A court can achieve the dual goals of compensation and deter-
rence relatively easily in face-to-face transactions, since a plain-
tiff's losses are generally equivalent to a defendant's gains in direct
"deals." In the open market, however, this balance is often dis-
rupted °0 and thus the policy of reasonable deterrence may collide
with the goal of compensating fully each individual plaintiff.110 As
a result, the measures of damages used in face-to-face situations
may not be suitable in the open market setting.1
A rescissory measure of damages, for example, is grounded in
103. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text; note 73 supra and case cited
therein.
104. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text; note 73 supra and case cited
therein.
105. See notes 41, 56 & 68-73 supra and accompanying text.
106. Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
970 (1979). See notes 74-85 supra and accompanying text.
107. 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1979). This case has
been noted in 12 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 233 (1978).
108. 576 F.2d at 1338.
109. See Note, Insiders' Liability Under Rule lOb-5 for the Illegal Purchase of Ac-
tively Traded Securities, 78 YALu L.J. 864, 891 (1969). The basic problem stems from the
fact that buyers' and sellers' orders are extremely difficult and often impossible to match in
an impersonal market.
110. See Note, supra note 5, at 79.




the notion that a contract of sale is voided and restitution
achieved; yet in the open market there is no privity between pur-
chasers and sellers, nor is there a contract of sale.1 2 Moreover,
while a subjective determination of what a plaintiff would have
done absent any deceptive misconduct is necessary for most dam-
age calculations in face-to-face transactions, such a precise deter-
mination for each of the potentially thousands of plaintiffs in an
impersonal market is impracticable.113 Additionally, conflicts may
arise among different plaintiffs concerning the valuation of securi-
ties on particular trading days;11 4 while this does not necessarily
defeat class action certification,11 5 it is nevertheless unwieldy. By
far the largest problem with the use of any of the conventional
measures of damages in the open market, however, is the potential
for recoveries vastly disproportionate to either the defendant's
gain or his wrongdoing, since to compensate each plaintiff's loss
during the period of nondisclosure or ignorance of the fraud could
result in staggering sums.16 Prior to Elkind, courts had not defini-
tively resolved these problems, although they had set forth some
possible solutions. In this connection current courts are confronted
with two questions: first, to what class of plaintiffs are defendants
liable, and second, what is the amount that each plaintiff will
receive?
117
The first case squarely to consider damages in a private 10b-5
action 118 against insiders in an impersonal market was Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.119 The court held defendant company lia-
ble for failure to make timely disclosure of a substantial drilling
112. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring in part).
113. See Jacobs, supra note 16, at 1107-08; Note, supra note 45, at 373, 376.
114. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring. in part); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907-09 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
115. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976).
116. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 323 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d
1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring in part); Jacobs, supra note 16, at 1130-31;
Note, supra note 9, at 306.
117. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 1130.
118. Prior to Mitchell, the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F.
Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), had ordered defendants to disgorge their
profits from the same transaction involved in Mitchell, leaving it to private litigants to file
their claims for compensation from this fund. 312 F. Supp. at 92.
119. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
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discovery, as well as for the issue of a press release that was inac-
curate, misleading, and deceptive in its guarded assessment of the
size of the discovery. Plaintiffs in Mitchell were investors who sold
their shares prior to a later curative press release, which resulted
in a sharp upturn in the market price of Texas Gulf Sulphur
(TGS) stock. After rejecting the argument that open market inves-
tors should be protected by rule 10b-5 only through SEC enforce-
ment actions,120 the court held that all investors who had relied on
the misleading release could recover, since the release was a sub-
stantial factor contributing to plaintiffs' course of conduct.22 1 As
for damages, the court determined that the case was inappropriate
for any form of restitution1 22 and decided that the proper measure
was the amount it would have taken plaintiffs to reinvest in TGS
stock within a reasonable time after being informed of the curative
press release. The court thus used the "cover" measure, calculating
the difference between the highest value achieved by the TGS
stock-during the period allowed after disclosure for plaintiffs to
become apprised of the situation and to reinvest-and the consid-
eration originally received for the shares. 28
After Mitchell, a district court reached an entirely different
result in Reeder v. Mastercraft Electronics Corp.,"" although it
still attempted to rely upon conventional damage computations
used in face-to-face transactions. Plaintiffs in Reeder purchased
stock in a corporation that had misrepresented its marketing pros-
pects. Employing a broad interpretation of the scope of rule 10b-5,
the court held that reliance is unnecessary in an open market
transaction even if the wrongdoing involves misrepresentation.1 2 5
In awarding damages, the Reeder court held that "plaintiffs [who
have not sold their stock] may recover their entire purchase price.
. ..Plaintiffs who sold their stock may recover the difference be-
tween their purchase price and the price at which they sold their
shares."12 6 Thus, the court fashioned an eclectic remedy that gave
strict rescission to plaintiffs who still possessed their shares and
120. Id. at 101.
121. Id. at 101-02.
122. Id. at 105. The court found that there was no privity between the parties upon
which to base the remedy, and that to make restitution for each investor would cause undue
hardship on the corporation. Id.
123. Id. at 104-06.
124. 363 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
125. Id. at 581.
126. Id. at 581-82.
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Chasins-type recovery to those investors who had already resold.12 7
Judge Sneed of the Ninth Circuit refuted the use of a rescis-
sory method of calculating damages in an often cited concurrence
in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.12 Green concerned an at-
tempt by defendants to attack class action certification by way of a
writ of mandamus, which the majority refused to issue. Judge
Sneed argued that if the court based certification upon the as-
sumption that it would use a rescissory measure of damages, then
it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to certify the
class action.129 While noting that there are theoretical difficulties
with a rescissory theory in the open market because there is
neither privity nor an undertaking by defendant to assume respon-
sibility for plaintiff's loss, Judge Sneed asserted that it would be
inappropriate to hold defendant liable for the full decline in value
of plaintiff's stock between the purchase date and the date of the
disclosure of the fraud, when only a portion of that diminution
may have been proximately caused by the defendant's wrong.13 0 If,
on the other hand, the court based certification upon the assump-
tion that a strict out-of-pocket measure of damages would be used,
Judge Sneed felt that certification would not be an abuse of the
trial judge's discretion." 1 A "price line" and a "value line" could
be set up for each day between the misrepresentations and the
date of disclosure, and plaintiffs could recover the difference be-
tween the price paid or received for the security and its actual
value on the date of the fraudulent transaction.13 2 According to
Judge Sneed, this out-of-pocket measure "furthers the purpose of
rule 10b-5 without subjecting the wrongdoer to damages the inci-
dence of which resembles that of natural disasters.
'1 3 3
Perhaps the most well-known case to address the scope of a
plaintiff class for an open market violation is Shapiro v. Merrill
127. See Note, supra note 5, at 99.
128. 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976).
129. Id. at 1341-44 (Sneed, J., concurring in part).
130. Id. at 1341-43 (Sneed, J., concurring in part). Judge Sneed stated that the mea-
sure is what the purchasers lost as a result of defendant's wrong, not what the defendant
gained. Thus, he claimed that the rescissory measure of damages does not accurately mea-
sure that loss; instead, it awards market decline unrelated "both to any benefits derived by
the defendant from his fraud and to the blameworthiness of his conduct." Id. at 1342
(Sneed, J., concurring in part).
131. Id. at 1344-46 (Sneed, J., concurring in part).
132. This formula would be modified somewhat for those investors who sell prior to
disclosure. Id. (Sneed, J., concurring in part).
133. Id. at 1344 (Sneed, J., concurring in part).
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Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc."' In Shapiro an underwriter
attempted to protect its customers' investments by disclosing non-
public information to them about the imminent plunge in the
earnings of a company. The customers naturally traded their
shares in anticipation of the stock's decline. Plaintiffs asked for
damages for their "substantial losses ' '1 ss as well as an accounting of
defendants' profits, claiming that they would not have purchased
the stock had they been privy to the inside information. Defen-
dants attempted to limit the class of plaintiffs to purchasers of the
actual stock that defendants sold, but the court rejected this argu-
ment, saying that "it would make a mockery of the 'disclose or ab-
stain' rule if we were to permit the fortuitous matching of buy and
sell orders [to determine liability]."' 6 The court went on to hold
that, in order to effectuate the policy of the Act,1 37 defendants
could be held liable in a private action for damages to all persons
who purchased the stock in the open market during the period of
nondisclosure without knowledge of material inside information.'"
The Shapiro court refused to distinguish between nontrading tip-
pers and trading tippees.13' Defendants, however, claimed that
since plaintiffs would have purchased the stock regardless of de-
fendants' rule 10b-5 violations, those infractions neither caused
plaintiffs' loss nor induced their reliance. Repudiating this argu-
ment, the court held that a plaintiff proves reliance and causation
if he shows that he would have acted differently if the inside infor-
mation had been disclosed to him.140 The Shapiro court, however,
declined to award damages, remanding the issue to the district
court because certain facts were not apparent from the existing re-
cord. In remanding, the court said that it was "not unmindful"
of defendants' arguments against a potential "Draconian liability,"
and that it did not "foreclose the possibility" that the district
court might limit the extent of defendants' liability according to
134. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 95,377 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
135. Id. at 236.
136. Id.
137. The court stated that "the purpose behind Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is to
protect the investing public and to secure fair dealing in the securities markets by promot-
ing full disclosure of inside information so that an informed judgment can be made by all
investors who trade in such markets." Id. at 235.
138. Id. at 237.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 238-39.
141. Id. at 241. The court mentioned as absent facts such as the paramaters of the
class action and the extent of defendants' trading and their expenses.
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the character of their violations.1"2
The Sixth Circuit in Fridrich v. Bradford4s reached a conclu-
sion diametrically opposed to that in Shapiro concerning the scope
of defendant's liability for an open market violation. Defendant in
Fridrich violated rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose negotiations for
an upcoming merger and by purchasing shares of the acquiring
corporation in anticipation of a price surge in its stock. The dis-
trict court held that all purchasers during the period of nondisclo-
sure could recover in accordance with the "cover" measure of dam-
ages. On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit expressed concern that
this measurement would subject defendant to liability to investors
who sold their stock to traders other than him when there was no
proof that his trading activities had any impact upon the stock's
price or upon the plaintiff's decision to trade.'" The court con-
cluded that it must place some limitation upon recovery in the
open market in order to avoid individual injustice, discouragement
of corporate ownership by officers and directors, and compensatory
recoveries disproportionate to either a defendant's gain or to his
wrongdoing. 14 5 This conclusion prompted the Fridrich court to de-
142. Id. at 242. On remand the district court also failed to reach the question of mea-
surement of damages, holding only that the class requested was appropriate. The court,
however, did say that
[p]olicy considerations favoring vigorous enforcement of the antifraud laws must be
weighed against the potential consequences of unrestrained damages. Where a "Draco-
nian" liability is possible, a court may be more reluctant than otherwise to find liabil-
ity. Rule 10b-5 was not intended to provide a general investors' indemnity. Lest its
sweep destroy legitimate business activity in an attempt to preserve market integrity,
this severe Rule must be applied carefully. Similarly, the various functions of 10b-
5-compensatory, deterrent and prophylactic-must be examined in devising suitable
damages. Availability of the class action procedure will piofoundly affect the mainte-
nance and prosecution of antifraud actions. For example, if recovery amounts to dis-
gorgement of illegal profits.... it will be limited to a fixed sum determined by X
dollars per share sold by defendants. The recovery by the class would be the same
regardless of class size, a result which might in certain instances provide an incentive
for the representative to limit the plaintiff class .... On the other hand, if damages
are measured by X dollars per share purchased by plaintiffs, multiplied by the number
of shares, purchased during the relevant period of liability, then the recovery will vary
directly with the class size. This type of award is restitutional.
•.. Unfortunately, the parties have not presented briefs addressing these ques-
tions, which must await trial for resolution.
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fn.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,377, at 98,883-84 (1975) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
143. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
144. Id. at 308.
145. Id. at 309, 313, 320, 322 n.33. As the court noted,
Where private civil actions under Rule 10b-5 have been employed in essentially
face-to-face situations, the potential breadth of the action was usually contained. How-
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termine that the scope of the civil remedy need not invariably be
coextensive with the reach of the SEC enforcement actions.
4 6
While the private right of action is a necessary enforcement sup-
plement to SEC action, the court felt that the private action's pri-
mary purpose is to compensate plaintiffs for damages caused by a
defendant's illegal acts.4 The Fridrich court distinguished Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States,14 8 in which the Supreme Court
held that proof of causation and reliance is subsumed in proof of
materiality or "causation in fact." The court reasoned that the per-
sonal relationship among the parties and plaintiffs' justifiable ex-
pectation of full disclosure in Affiliated Ute were not present in
the impersonal transaction in Fridrich.149 The court then pointed
to Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,150 in which a
district court held that some "semblance of privity" must exist be-
tween seller and purchaser, " " and reversed the lower court's find-
ing of liability because there was neither this semblance of privity
nor a sufficient causal connection between defendant's misconduct
and plaintiff's loss.15 2 Thus, under this approach, a plaintiff must
show more than the materiality of the undisclosed information "5
unless he is in the class of investors trading contemporaneously
with the insider and thereby a proper beneficiary of the relaxed
causation standard in Affiliated Ute.1" According to Fridrich, the
ever, extension of the private remedy to impersonal market cases where plaintiffs have
neither dealt with defendants nor been influenced in their trading decisions by any act
of the defendants would present a situation wholly lacking in the natural limitations on
damages present in cases dealing with face-to-face transactions.
Id. at 321.
146. Id. at 320. The court stated that "[t]he key issue... is not whether... Rule
10b-5 should encompass open market transactions, which they should, but whether the civil
remedy must invariably be coextensive in its reach with the reach of the SEC.... ." Id.
(emphasis added).
147. Id. at 314. The logical extension of these arguments is that if there is to be a
limitation on recovery as well as compensation of all plaintiffs, the limitation must be in the
nature of a smaller class of plaintiffs.
148. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
149. 542 F.2d at 319-20.
150. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afld, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
151. Id. at 706.
152. 542 F.2d at 317-19.
153. Id. at 326 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
154. Id. As for deterrence, the court pointed out that SEC investigations, criminal
sanctions, and SEC disgorgement actions are available in addition to this private action.
The court further remarked that "[w]hether the sanctions imposed upon the defendants
here together with others which were also available amount to a sufficient vindication of the
public rights and to an adequate deterrent to future misconduct we need not say. We may
at least observe that the impact is bound to be significant." Id. at 322.
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logical inconsistency of Shapiro was its assumption that the denial
of material information itself caused plaintiff's injury. Fridrich,
however, assumed that the loss resulted from the trading on that
information:
We conceive it be the act of trading which essentially constitutes the viola-
tion of Rule 10b-5, for it is this which brings the illicit benefit to the insider,
and it is this conduct which impairs the integrity of the market and which is
the target of the rule. If the insider does not trade, he has an absolute right
to keep material inside information secret. Investors must be prepared to ac-
cept the risk of trading in an open market without complete or always accu-
rate information. Defendants' trading did not alter plaintiffs' expectations
when they sold their stock, and in no way influenced plaintiffs' trading
decision.
We hold, therefore, the defendants' act of trading with third persons was
not causally connected with any claimed loss by plaintiff who traded on the
impersonal market and who were otherwise unaffected by the wrongful acts
of the insider.""5
In a noteworthy concurrence Judge Celebrezze expanded on
the Fridrich majority's rationale. He noted that since the mechan-
ics of an impersonal market make it impossible to match buy and
sell orders, insiders owe a duty of disclosure to all investors who
trade on the market during the period of insider trading. 1"5 Non-
contemporaneous traders do not, according to Celebrezze, "require
the special protection of the 'disclose or abstain' rule because they
do not suffer the disadvantage of trading with someone who has
superior access to information. ' 157 When tipping of inside informa-
tion is at issue, however, the situation is changed because the in-
sider has perpetuated the informational imbalance and created a
situation that only full public disclosure will remedy. Since Sha-
piro was such a case, Judge Celebrezze conceded that the court in
that case may have properly defined the class of potential
plaintiffs.
158
In addition to the solutions to the open market problem prof-
fered by the courts, commentators have suggested even more pos-
sibilities.1 59 A number of them have submitted that deterrence
rather than compensation should be the overriding concern of
courts in open market transactions.5 0 One commentator in partic-
155. Id. at 318-19 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 324 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 326 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 327 (Celebreeze, J., concurring).
159. For a discussion of several of these possibilities, see Jacobs, supra note 16, at
1131-37.
160. Note, supra note 5, at 100-01; Note, Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule 10b-5 and
the Federal Securities Code, 72 MICH. L. Rzv. 1398, 1429-30 (1974).
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ular suggested that the solution outlined in the American Law In-
stitute's proposed Federal Securities Code,161 which limits recovery
by placing a ceiling on the amount of defendant's damages equal to
his profits rather than by narrowing the plaintiff class, deserves
serious consideration.162 The court in Elkind agreed and adopted
in full the proposed Code's measure of damages for open market
fraud.
III. LIMITED RECOVERY: THE NEW APPROACH IN
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.'3"
Elkind involved corporate officers who tipped material inside
information to financial analysts, who in turn persuaded some of
their customers to trade based upon that information. In 1971 Lig-
gett & Myers, Inc. (Liggett) enjoyed a record year, and the consen-
sus among analysts in the financial community was that 1972
would be an equally prosperous year for the company. Liggett it-
self, though less sanguine internally than were the analysts, was
also optimistic and generally represented that it was going to have
a "good year." 1"
Beginning in May of 1972, however, the Liggett board of direc-
tors began to receive information indicating that earnings for the
second quarter would show a dramatic decline. As this information
became more conclusive, the Liggett directors decided to issue a
press release stating that earnings would be down. In anticipation
of this press release, which was issued on July 18, two corporate
insiders made two separate "tips" to financial analysts concerning
the upcoming public statement. The first alleged "tip," which
eventually resulted in the sale of 100 shares of Liggett stock, was
made on July 10 by Liggett's Director of Corporate Communica-
tions to an analyst at Kuhn Loeb & Co. The tipper confirmed that
certain sales were slowing and that competition was stiffening, and
responded noncommittally to the question whether a ten percent
decline in earnings was a realistic projection. Liggetts' chief
161. ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 1603, 1703(b), 1708(b), 1711(j) (1978 draft). The Code's
solution focuses on deterrence and allows for compensation only if practicable. Note, supra
note 160, at 1431. The court in Fridrich rejected this scheme because it felt that courts were
unsuited for this type of rulemaking. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 322 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
162. Note, supra note 160, at 1430-31.
163. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
164. Id. at 160. In fact, Liggett issued a press release in March of 1972 stating that the
first two months of 1972 had been good months for the company;, in April the company
offered a $50 million debenture issue. Id. at 159.
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financial officer made the second tip, which consisted of an affirma-
tive response to the analyst's question whether earnings would be
down, and which occurred one day before the company's press re-
lease. This second tip carried the qualification that this informa-
tion was confidential, but it resulted in the sale of 1800 Liggett
shares by the analyst's customers. 65
In a class action plaintiffs contended, among other things, that
both of these tips constituted violations of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 for which defendant corporation should be held liable for
damages. The trial court found both tips to be in violation of rule
10b-5 and held defendants liable for damages to all plaintiffs who
purchased Liggett stock from the time of trading on the first "tip,"
which was on July 11, 1972, to the time the inside information was
made public on July 17, 1972. Following the theory that the mea-
sure of damages should be the difference between the price paid
and the price plaintiff would have paid had there been disclosure
of the adverse information, the court turned to the Mitchell case
to find that the latter figure was the lowest value reached by the
Liggett stock during a reasonable period after disclosure long
enough for investors to have become apprised of the situation.1"
The court then estimated that this method would yield a total re-
covery of approximately $740,000 and refuted defendant's claim
that this was a "Draconian liability.
'16 7
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the finding of liability
on the first tip because of a lack of either materiality or scienter.
The court, however, held that the July 17 tip was sufficiently re-
lated to earnings to be material and that there was ample evidence
to support a finding of scienter in connection with this tip. This
165. Id. at 161.
166. 472 F. Supp. 123, 130-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The district court first set up a "price
line" and a "value line" similar to that suggested by Judge Sneed in his Green concurrence
and awarded each plaintiff the difference between the price paid for his Liggett shares and
the lower amount he would have had to pay had the tipped information been disclosed. The
court then estimated that the total amount of recovery would be approximately $791,000. In
its opinion amending findings of fact and conclusions of law, however, the district court
altered this method because it felt that the evidence used to arrive at the figures of what
Liggett stock would have sold for on the days in question was unreliable.
167. 472 F. Supp. at 134-35. The court reasoned that the damages were "necessary to
effectuate the purpose of 10b-5 as well as to partially compensate plaintiffs for the loses
which they suffered." Id. at 134. It noted that not all plaintiffs would fie claims and that
Liggett's net operating profits had exceeded $30 million in both 1971 and 1972. The court
also cited Fridrich for the proposition that a court is ill-suited to adopt the ALI Federal
Securities Code solution, but it distinguished Fridrich by pointing to Judge Celebrezze's




partial reversal further limited the class of plaintiffs to those who
purchased Liggett stock between the afternoon of July 17 and the
close of the market on July 18.
The court then addressed the question of damages, noting at
the outset that this was a matter of first impression. 168 Judge
Mansfield's majority opinion pointed out that the lower court had
used the "out-of-pocket" measure employed in face-to-face trans-
actions, but it noted that the element of inducement by misrepre-
sentation or omission found in face-to-face transactions was lack-
ing in an impersonal market. 169 The court then reiterated the
established rule that the public has no absolute right to know in-
side information, but that it is entitled to an honest market.
Therefore, according to the court in Elkind, the combination of the
tip and the tippee's trading in the market is the evil to be
thwarted. Thus, if the insider chooses not to trade on the inside
information, then the investor can claim no injury.17
Having thus differentiated the case at hand from face-to-face
transactions, the Second Circuit stated that courts should construe
flexibly the securities laws in general and damages in particular.
Discussing several possible damage measures, the court rejected
the lower court's out-of-pocket measure for three reasons: first, it
presupposes an element of directly traceable inducement that is
present in a face-to-face transaction but lacking in an impersonal
market; second, proof of the actual value absent the fraudulent
conduct is speculative;171 and last, there is potential for the imposi-
tion of "exorbitant" damages that are disproportionate to the
wrong committed and that "lin[e] the pocket of all interim inves-
tors and their counsel at the expense of innocent corporate stock-
holders. 1 72 The court also dismissed as unworkable the "causa-
tion-in-fact approach" to damages, which allows recovery solely for
the erosion in market value of the stock that is directly traceable
168. 635 F.2d at 168.
169. Id. at 168-69.
170. Id. at 169.
171. Id. at 169-70. The court noted that this problem had led some courts, including
the court below, to value the fair value of the stock by reference to postpublic disclosure
market prices. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text. According to the court, this
practice rested on the often invalid assumptions that the tipped information is virtually
identical to that later disclosed, and that public reaction in the market to disclosure is ap-
proximately the same as it would have been at an earlier date. Id. at 170.
172. Id. According to the court, this would be particularly inequitable in a case in
which a tippee sells a few shares of heavily traded stock that drops substantially when the
public information is disclosed. Id.
19811
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to the tipper's wrongful trading. While conceding that the latter
measure has the advantage of avoiding windfall damages and
awarding only those losses that are actually caused by the fraud,
the court held that these benefits are outweighed by the almost
impossible burden of proving how the insider trading affected the
market and by the measure's failure to allow recovery for violation
of a duty to disclose.
17 8
The Elkind court then adopted a third alternative:
(1) to allow any uniformed investor, where a reasonable investor would either
have delayed his purchase or not purchased at all if he had had the benefit of
the tipped information, to recover any post-purchase decline in market value
of his shares up to a reasonable time after he learns of the tipped information
or after there is a public disclosure of it but (2) limit his recovery to the
amount gained by the tippee as a result of his selling at the earlier date
rather than delaying his sale until the parties could trade on an equal infor-
mational basis.17
4
The court thus embraced the "disgorgement measure" recom-
mended by the proposed Federal Securities Code.17 5 According to
the court, a disgorgement calculation deters misconduct by depriv-
ing tippers and tippees of any gain, while simultaneously avoiding
windfall recoveries and the proof problems of the other mea-
sures.170 Additionally, the court reasoned that "[i]n most cases the
damages recoverable under the disgorgement measure would be
roughly commensurate to the actual harm caused by the tippee's
wrongful conduct.1
17 7
The court acknowledged that there were difficulties with the
173. Id. at 171. The court noted that it is especially difficult to isolate a rise or decline
in market value attributable to a defendant's misconduct when the tippee trades only mod-
erately in a heavily traded stock. Id.
174. Id. at 172. The court posed the hypothetical that if the tippee sold 5,000 shares at
$50 per share and the stock dropped to $40 per share within a reasonable time after disclo-
sure, then plaintiffs could recover their losses up to a ceiling of $50,000 (5,000 shares multi-
plied by the $10 per share decline in market value that is the tippee's gain). Id.
175. See notes 161-62 supra and accompanying text.
176. A plaintiff under the Elkind holding must prove only the following- First, his
purchase price and the number of shares bought; second, that a reasonable investor would
have altered his purchase decision if he had been in possession of the inside information;
and last, the price to which the security had fallen when he learned of the information, or
within a reasonable time after it became public. 635 F.2d at 172.
177. Id. The court reasoned that
[i]n a case where the tippee sold only a few shares, for instance, the likelihood of his
conduct causing any substantial injury to intervening investors buying without benefit
of his confidential information would be small. If, on the other hand, the tippee sold
large amounts of stock, realizing substantial profits, the likelihood of injury to inter-




measure. It noted that the disgorgement theory modifies the pro-
position that gain to a defendant should not be a touchstone for
rule 10b-5 liability and partially duplicates SEC disgorgement pro-
ceedings. The court conceded the possibility of windfall recoveries
when the market in a stock is unusually depressed due to causes
unrelated to the insider trading, but it also recognized the possibil-
ity that claimants will sometimes be limited to pro rata shares and
that class actions will be too nonremunerative to be worthwhile.
Nevertheless, the Elkind court concluded that "as between the va-
rious alternatives we are persuaded, after weighing the pros and
cons, that the disgorgement measure, despite some disadvantages,
offers the most equitable resolution of the difficult problems cre-
ated by conflicting interests." 17 8
IV. ANALYSIS
Although Elkind reached an unprecedented result, its limita-
tion on recovery and its use of defendant's profits as a ceiling
should not be surprising to one familiar with the background on
rule 10b-5 damages. A number of commentators had agreed with
the scheme envisioned by the proposed Federal Securities Code.173
Moreover, the Shapiro holding that all plaintiffs during the period
of nondisclosure can recover upon establishing materiality severely
restricted the Second Circuit in its choice of damages limitations.
Perhaps equally ominous was the trend in face-to-face transactions
toward requiring disgorgement of a wrongdoer's profits180 and the
admonition by courts against a damage award that is dispropor-
tionate to defendant's gain or to his misconduct.181 Furthermore,
there can be no doubt that the limited recovery contemplated by
Elkind represents a continuation of the current inclination in rule
10b-5 cases to narrow the rule's reach. Since the Supreme Court
has more strictly defined the elements for determining liability,
such as scienter and materiality,8 2 it is only logical that damage
awards should also be circumscribed. In fact, Judge Celebrezze in
his Fridrich concurrence explicitly noted the implications of recent
Supreme Court decisions for the direction that lower federal courts
should take in fashioning civil remedies. 182 Thus, although at first
178. Id. at 173.
179. See notes 161-62 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 74-85 supra and accompanying text.
181. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
182. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
183. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 323 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concur-
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blush the Elkind decision may appear to signal a sharp departure
from prior decisional law, recent trends in the area augured just
such a result.
Whether one agrees that courts should abate the expansion of
rule 10b-5 depends largely upon value judgments beyond the scope
of this Recent Development. Regardless of one's view of the policy
implications of rule 10b-5, however, there is little room for doubt
that a grossly disproportionate award of damages is never desira-
ble, no matter how logical its computation. It is equally indubita-
ble, however, that there should at least be some recovery for rule
10b-5 violations in the open market,"" since Congress was origi-
nally most concerned with the integrity of this market. 85 The
question, then, is how to keep recoveries within reasonable bounds
while still accomplishing the goals of the Act.
The Elkind court rightly rejected any theory that would com-
bine a Shapiro class of plaintiffs with a measure of damages used
in face-to-face transactions. In other words, the court was correct
in denying full compensation to all innocent traders during the
period of nondisclosure, since this is precisely the type of Draco-
nian liability that courts and commentators agree should be
avoided.' Thus, Elkind properly refused to follow either Mitchell
or Reeder, not only because both a cover measure and a rescissory
theory could result in outlandish recoveries, but also because there
are practical difficulties and theoretical inconsistencies involved in
the application of either method to an open market setting.8 7
Moreover, Judge Sneed's suggestion in Green that a strict out-of-
pocket theory would further the purpose of rule 10b-5 and at the
same time yield reasonable recoveries'" is unsound. Rigid adher-
ence to the out-of-pocket rule will fail to account for any posttran-
saction losses that result from fraudulent activity, which is most
common in impersonal market transactions and which later affects
the overall market value of a stock. 89 In any event, the fact that
the lower court in Elkind employed the out-of-pocket rule and ar-
rived at an excessive figure ' 0 should sufficiently refute any conten-
ring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
184. See note 146 supra.
185. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976). See Note, supra
note 9, at 310.
186. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 118-27 supra and accompanying text.
188. See notes 128-33 supra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
190. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
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tion that the measure yields reasonable recoveries.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit's Fridrich approach"1 of narrow-
ing the case through a reemphasis on traditional common law con-
cepts of privity, reliance, and causation is not the proper way to
limit recoveries. Admittedly, Fridrich has superficial appeal in that
it compensates all suing plaintiffs while yielding a recovery figure
for the purposes of deterrence that exceeds defendant's profits.
This theory, however, does not necessarily preclude excessive re-
coveries-heavily traded stock might yet produce a large class of
plaintiffs who traded contemporaneously with the defendants.
Moreover, placing greater emphasis on common-law proof require-
ments for noncontemporaneous traders in the open market is
anomalous when one considers that elements such as privity, reli-
ance on undisclosed inside information, and direct causation are
particularly lacking in an impersonal market. The Fridrich hold-
ing, therefore, is virtually tantamount to imposing as a prerequisite
to recovery on the open market the type of direct dealing with
noncontemporaneous traders that is found in face-to-face transac-
tions, a proposition that is logically inconsistent.192
Those investors who under Fridrich would benefit from the re-
laxed causation standard of Affiliated Ute-contemporaneous
traders according to Judge Celebrezze's concurrence 90--would be
allowed to sue purely because of a fortuitous and inequitable selec-
tion process. 1"' Just because an investor purchased at the same
time that an insider sold does not necessarily mean that there is
privity between the two parties or that the one's buy order match-
es the other's sell order. Perhaps even more significantly, the act of
contemporaneous trading does not mean that this innocent inves-
tor's loss is in any way different from that of a noncontemporane-
ous investor who bought or sold during the fraudulent period. In-
deed, this is the ultimate flaw in the Fridrich analysis, for while it
is true that the act of trading on the insider information is what
injures investors, it does not necessarily follow that it only or more
directly injures those investors who trade contemporaneously with
191. See notes 143-58 supra and accompanying text.
192. One commentator has even suggested that those plaintiffs trading on the open
market who prove that they negotiated or traded with the defendant should be able to re-
cover under an appropriate conventional measure of damages. Jacobs, supra note 16, at
1137.
193. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 326 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
194. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
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the defendants. On the contrary, there is normally no causal con-
nection between the insider's trade and the transactional decision
of an uninformed investor,195 so that all the losses incurred by in-
vestors trading during the nondisclosure period' 96 derive from a
common source. Consequently, any attempt to limit recovery on
the open market by reducing the plaintiff class beyond that which
the Shapiro decision defined will necessarily entail a certain degree
of fortuity and inequity. 97
The Elkind approach properly limits recovery by placing a
ceiling on the amount of damages. In this way, any reduction in
compensation will be distributed evenly among all injured inves-
tors. Moreover, plaintiffs will in many cases be made whole under
the Elkind rationale, since the plaintiff class will not always be
large and defendant's profits will not always be disproportionate to
plaintiffs' losses. The Elkind approach, however, does have serious
drawbacks. The court itself recognized that the disgorgement mea-
sure duplicates almost exactly the remedy in SEC enforcement ac-
tions. 98 Thus, one would expect that the method would bolster the
Commission's position by supplementing its deterrent efforts; in-
stead, however, the method creates a disincentive for a plaintiff to
bring a private action, since it holds out the possibility that a class
action will engulf his recovery. Indeed, if the dual purposes of an
implied civil cause of action under rule 10b-5 are compensation
and deterrence, the Elkind court has fallen short on both scores.
Not only is compensation restricted under the disgorgement mea-
sure, but deterrence is also minimal-a defendant in a private ac-
tion has only his profits at risk, in addition to the litigation costs
and loss of good name incident to any civil action. Although one
could argue that SEC and criminal sanctions are sufficient deter-
rents, this argument is belied by the original desire for implied pri-
vate damage actions to supplement the SEC's limited resources.""
195. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 1980).
196. This would not include those losses due to forces unrelated to defendant's
conduct.
197. An argument can be made that Shapiro and Elkind were intended to be limited
to cases of tippee trading, which Judge Celebrezze in Fridrich said might require an expan-
sion of the plaintiff class. See notes 156-58 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the argu-
ment would continue, Fridrich should apply in all other cases. This is a specious argument,
however, for it would be anomalous to allow a smaller monetary recovery in a situation that
requires greater enforcement.
198. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172 (2d Cir. 1980).
199. In his Fridrich concurrence, Judge Celebrezze responded to a commentator's sug-




Because Elkind resolved the tension between full compensation
and reasonable deterrence in favor of the latter-a correct result
considering the debilitating effects of full compensation in an im-
personal market-the court should have emphasized more strongly
the deterrence element.
Nevertheless, the Elkind result would indeed offer the "most
equitable resolution"200 of the problem if some added deterrence
and increased incentive to sue were factored into the disgorgement
measure. In this connection, future courts should consider punitive
damages as a means of improving upon the framework laid down
in Elkind 01 While it is true that exemplary damages have been
generally unavailable in rule 10b-5 private actions,202 the underly-
ing reasons for this disallowance evaporate upon application of the
disgorgement measure. It is true that the section 28(a) limitation
of recovery to "actual damages" can be read either as a prohibition
against exemplary damages or as a bar to double recovery.203 There
is, however, room to allow punitive damages without running afoul
of either statutory construction, since under the disgorgement
measure the amount recovered will often be less than plaintiffs'
actual losses.- In those cases in which plaintiffs' losses do not ex-
ceed or are equal to defendant's gain, no further punitive deterrent
is needed because a recovery above defendant's profits would not
have been allowed even under a scheme of full compensation for all
plaintiffs during the period of nondisclosure. In any event, it is
SEC manpower is limited and the time necessary to investigate and prosecute cases
which now are processed through the civil courts would, in many cases, be prohibitive.
Another [problem with the suggestion] is the limitation on the scope of remedies avail-
able to the SEC. Although courts have ordered disgorgement of profits as "ancillary
relief' in SEC injunctive actions, there is no such remedy if the Commission chooses to
proceed through administrative actions against investment advisors or broker-dealers.
Also, merely requiring an insider to disgorge the profits he made through his illegal
trading may not satisfy either the deterrent or compensatory goals of rule 1~b-5.
Criminal sanctions are an inadequate substitute for civil proceedings because of the
different standard of proof and other factors unrelated to securities regulation which
make a conviction for criminal charges much more difficult to procure than a finding of
civil liability. Civil liability serves both the deterrent and the compensatory functions
of rule 10b-5. The prospect of a substantial money judgment is likely to cause an in-
sider to pause and reflect before entering the market to trade on the basis of confiden-
tial information ....
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 324 n.6 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
200. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 173 (2d Cir. 1980).
201. See notes 12 and 86-98 supra and accompanying text.
202. See notes 12 and 86-98 supra and accompanying text.
203. See notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text.
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largely the threat of punitive damages rather than their actual im-
position that constitutes the deterrent, as well as the incentive to
sue, and presumably plaintiffs' damages would exceed the dis-
gorged amount in a sufficient number of cases to create a
deterrent.
Application of the disgorgement measure of damages to open
market transactions also avoids the usual policy rationale behind
disallowing punitive damages for rule 10b-5 violations. Those
courts that have faced the issue have uniformly questioned the
need for additional deterrence, primarily because of the availabil-
ity of class actions and large monetary recoveries in addition to
conventional deterrents.20 ' Under the limited relief approach taken
in Elkind, fewer alternative deterrents exist, and the balance be-
tween the need for deterrence and the potential problems
presented by exemplary damages tilts in favor of punitive damage
recoveries. Courts can use traditional judicial controls over verdicts
to avoid awards that are disproportionate to the harm done and
that may unduly burden innocent stockholders of public corpora-
tions. Furthermore, since recoveries are prorated under the dis-
gorgement measure, the administrative difficulties normally en-
countered when multiple plaintiffs sue at different times or in
different courts can be alleviated by including in the prorated dis-
gorgement amount an initial punitive damage award to be distrib-
uted among the various injured investors in the same way as the
defendant's profits. 0 5 In this manner, the courts can achieve goals
of reasonable deterrence, added incentives to sue, and increased
compensation without contravening the conventional policy and
statutory arguments against allowing exemplary damages for rule
10b-5 violations.
V. CONCLUSION
The Elkind court's adoption of a "disgorgement measure" of
damages for insider trading on undisclosed misrepresented mate-
rial information in the open market is basically sound. In allowing
compensation to the extent practicable,0 8 the Second Circuit chose
the best solution among the available alternatives. The decision's
paramount problems arise in its shifted emphasis to deterrence;
the court has neither provided plaintiffs with a sufficient incentive
204. See notes 88-93 supra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 88-93 supra and accompanying text.
206. See notes 159-62 supra and accompanying text.
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to sue nor created the level of deterrence that some cases might
require. Future courts, however, can remedy this situation if they
follow Elkind and also award punitive damages in cases in which
plaintiffs' losses exceed defendant's profits.
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